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Abstract
This paper proposes a 2-country 3-region economic geography model that
can account for the most salient stylized facts experienced by Eastern European
transition economies during the 1990s. In contrast to the existing literature,
which has favored technological explanations, trade liberalization and factor
mobility are the only driving forces. The model correctly predicts that in
the rst half of the decade trade liberalization led to divergence in GDP per
capita, both between the West and the East and within the East. Consistent
with the data, in the second half of the decade, internal labor mobility in the
East reversed this process, and convergence became the dominant force. The
model furthermore shows that the same U-shaped pattern applies to relative
industrialization of West and East, although within the East the hinterland
continued to lose industry throughout the decade.
1 Introduction
The decade of the 1990s in Eastern European transition economies has been char-
acterized by a U-shaped pattern of relative development. Initially, relative income
per capita between Western and Eastern Europe diverged, and from the middle of
the decade onward, this pattern reversed, and Eastern Europe started to catch up
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with its Western counterpart. When analyzing the relative performance of di¤erent
Eastern European countries, a similar pattern emerges. The countries closest to the
West initially experienced faster growth than the Hinterland, but in the second half
of the decade that pattern also reversed.
The literature has typically explained these U-shaped patterns by relying on tech-
nological arguments or on the misallocation of factors of production. Boldrin and
Canova (2003), for example, suggest that technological obsolescence led to an ini-
tial period of intense unemployment and reallocations after trade was liberalized.
Blanchard (1996) and Blanchard and Kremer (1997) link the initial slump to mi-
croeconomic disorganization. The collapse of the state sector was precipitated by
traditional input suppliers, who found attractive opportunities outside the state sec-
tor and broke the established productive chains.1 Cociuba (2006) and Keller (1997)
also stress the role played by technology adoption to account for the GDP trajectories
of Eastern European countries. The existing literature thus puts the emphasis on the
intensity of reallocations that were needed to adapt to a superior Western technol-
ogy, followed by a remarkable catch-up process that was conditioned (and sometimes
threatened) by redistributive public policies.
While we do not claim these explanations are erroneous in any way, in this paper
we deliberately disregard issues of technological backwardness or sectoral misalloca-
tions. Instead, we propose an economic geography model, where trade liberalization
and factor mobility are the only driving forces. The model consists of 2 countries
(West and East) and three regions (one region in West, and a Border and Hinterland
in the East). To make the results as sharp as possible, West and East have identical
technologies and endowments. Agriculture is perfectly competitive, and industry is
monopolistically competitive. Although workers are perfectly mobile between sectors,
1According to Blanchard and Kremer (1997), international trade was - if at all - benecial to
stabilize those economies, since it provided them with abundant new input suppliers, capable of re-
placing the previously destroyed economic relationships. Here our paper suggests that an immediate
exposure to international trade might have been damaging to CEE countries in the short run.
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there is no labor mobility between East and West. As for labor mobility within the
East, part of the policy experiment consists in understanding how the introduction
of labor mobility between Border and Hinterland a¤ects relative economic perfor-
mance. Trade in industrial goods is subject to transport costs, which are higher
between Hinterland and West than between Border and West. As in Krugman and
Venables (1995), industrial rms use intermediate goods, which gives rise to forward
and backward linkages.
This simple setup, which abstracts from technology and endowment di¤erences,
is su¢ cient to account for the main stylized facts. Before describing the results in
some more detail, we need to be more specic about the timing and the extent of the
two driving forces, trade liberalization and factor mobility. The focus of our analysis
is the decade of the 1990s. The European Union had already liberalized much of
trade with Eastern Europe in the very early 90s. Later in the decade, labor mobility
within Eastern Europe, which traditionally had been virtually illegal, was liberalized.
We can therefore conclude that trade liberalization predated migration within the
East. One could of course wonder why we do not analyze labor mobility between
East and West as well. However, with the exception of ethnic Germans, migration
between East and West only took o¤ in earnest at the turn of the century, so it cannot
account for the reversal in the U-shaped pattern around the middle of the decade.
The rst result is that trade liberalization between West and East leads to di-
vergence in GDP per capita, both between West and East and between Border and
Hinterland. The positive performance of West can be explained by a Home mar-
ket e¤ect. As trade costs drop, rms shift towards the larger market. This same
phenomenon gives rise to the relative deindustrialization of East in favor of West.
Proximity to the larger market has benets though, given the crucial access to the
bulk of consumption goods and intermediate output. This explains the divergence
between Border and Hinterland, in favor of the region closest to the West.
The second result is that the introduction of labor mobility within East leads
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to convergence in GDP per capita, not just between Border and Hinterland (which
is obvious), but also between West and East. As soon as migrations are allowed,
population moves from Hinterland to Border. This allows for a stronger Home market
e¤ect in East. As a result, Border attracts new rms, and income per capita in East
starts to catch up with that of West. Within East, income di¤erences between Border
and Hinterland go down, but in terms of industrialization, Border continues to gain
relative to Hinterland.
It is important to realize that - at least under our parameterization - trade lib-
eralization alone would not be able to account for the upward part of the U-shaped
pattern between West and East and between Border and Hinterland2. Allowing for
labor mobility is therefore what drives the revival of East. However, it is su¢ cient
for labor mobility to be introduced within East for income per capita to converge
between East and West. Of course, permitting labor mobility between East and West
would only reinforce our results.
Our model can be viewed of a generalization of Krugman and Venables (1995).
They showed how in a 2-region model the early stages of trade liberalization could
bring about lower real wages and deindustrialization in smaller markets. The di¤er-
ence with our 3-region model is that we can analyze both the relative performance
of East and West and Border and Hinterland. In other words, we can say something
about the internal geography of East.. This approach has other potential applications.
For example, one may be interested in understanding how trade liberalization a¤ects
the internal geography of China. To address this issue, clearly a 3-region model, such
as the one we propose, is needed. 3
2It is true that, in a setting with two symmetric countries, Puga (1999) predicts that trade
alone would generate a nal East-West convergence stage. Nevertheless, the existence of an internal
trade barrier within the East gives rise to an asymmetry in the size of the markets, which prevents
convergence unless migration is introduced. In any case, we can understand the introduction of
free migration as a way to accelerate the upcoming of convergence (both East-West and Border-
Hinterland) as trade barriers melt away.
3Another interesting point is exploring the normative implications of free internal labor mobility.
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Our work is also related to Puga and Venables (1997), with the qualication that
we explore asymmetric country sizes. That practice is also undertaken by Forslid
(2004), although his model does not permit the study of labor mobility, and the ab-
sence of vertical linkages prevents a detailed welfare analysis. Finally, Venables (2000)
presents a similar three-location framework as we do, but he focuses on the internal
geography of a developing country that is hardly industrialized for intermediate levels
of trade costs. Our starting point is di¤erent: for all levels of trade costs, both West
and East are industrialized.4
To the best of our knowledge, there are very few papers dealing explicitly with
trade liberalization and the internal geography and welfare of Eastern European coun-
tries. One of them is Crozet and Koenig-Soubeyran (2002). They extend Krugman
(1991) by including a third location (the EU) and allowing for a di¤erential regional
access to the EUmarket within the CEECs. They analyze in depth the di¤erent forces
shaping the prevalence of the Border over the Hinterland, although their model cannot
study deindustrialization at the national level, and does not reproduce the external
and internal patterns of convergence.
Another paper of interest is Damijan and Kostevc (2002), who study the role
played by FDI to accelerate the arrival of an interregional-convergence stage within
Eastern Europe. The role played by FDI in their model resembles the one played
here by internal migration. Nevertheless, in their setting the Hinterland - understood
as the region where the state capital locates - is larger than the Border and benets
Unfortunately, our conclusions - though interesting - are very dependent on our parameterization
and di¢ cult to generalize.
4Brakman and Garretsen (1993) and Ross (2001) are two interesting applications of economic-
geography models to the understanding of internal disparities in the unied Germany. Nevertheless,
they do not introduce a third location (the larger EU) as a signicant element to explain those
evolutions. They just portray a lowering of internal trade barriers between both German regions.
Their models - as Krugman (1991) and Forslid and Ottaviano (1999) - , link the mass of manufac-
turing varieties to the stock of mobile labor, which prevents a study of global industrialization /
deindustrialization.
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from the absorption of manufacturing activity in the early stages of trade openness.
That is just the opposite to what Crozet and Koenig (2002) and our model predict.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the stylized
facts we aim to explain, and justies the main assumptions underlying our policy
experiment. Section 3 presents the analytical framework. Section 4 uses numeri-
cal experiments to study the e¤ect of trade liberalization and migration. Section 5
concludes.
2 Policy changes and stylized facts
2.1 Policy changes
We start by discussing the two main policy changes we focus on: increased trade
openness between West and East, and internal labor mobility within East. Justifying
their relative timing, with trade liberalization predating labor mobility, is important
for our policy experiments.
East-West trade liberalization
The route towards East-West trade liberalization started quite early in countries like
Yugoslavia or Romania. In particular, the European Community signed an initial
Generalized System of Preferences with Romania in 1974, and an agreement on man-
ufacturing trade was reached in 1980. However, The most comprehensive Generalized
Systems of Preferences (GSP) were approved by the EU and individual CEE countries
at the beginning of the 1990s, from 1990 to 1992. The EU granted GSP status rst to
Hungary and Poland (1990), then to Bulgaria and former Czechoslovakia (1991), and
subsequently to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (1992). In short, "the features found
in the trading pattern of CEECs suggest that the export share towards EU-15 was,
in the rst half of the 1990s, relatively high partly because reduction in trade barriers
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had already taken place." (De Benedictis, De Santis and Vicarelli (2005)).
Since the beginning of the integration process there has been a huge increase in
trade ows between the EU-15 and Eastern Europe. Between 1989 and 1999 trade
between the EU-15 and Eastern Europe experienced a six-fold increase. As argued
by Petrakos, Fotopoulos and Kallioras (2005), trade is predominantly of the intra-
industry type.
Migratory liberalization within East, but not between East and West
According to Kaczmarczyk and Okolski (2005), during the communist era migration
in Eastern Europe was negligible. This does not only apply to migration between
countries, but also within countries. Rural-to-urban mobility was also greatly de-
layed and generally low. In contrast to Western European nations, in many Eastern
countries the process of industrialization took place in the absence of massive urban-
ization.
It was during the 1990s when substantial policy reforms were enacted to liberalize
labor ows across Eastern European countries. For example, in 1993 the Czech Re-
public established a liberal migration policy which turned the country into the home
to tens of thousands of migrants from Europe and Asia during the decade (Drbohlav,
2005). In 1993 Russia abolished the internal passport and allowed for freedom of
movement (Heleniak, 2002).
To understand the magnitude of the phenomenon, in 1989 fewer than 3 million vis-
itors entered Poland from the Soviet Union, but their number more than doubled the
next year and continued to grow to more than 14 million in the peak year 1997. Al-
though these numbers talk about visitors, a survey conducted in Ukraine and Poland
in 1995 suggests that many of the so-called visitors worked illegally during their stays
in Poland, mostly as petty traders. They were encouraged by the economic crisis in
the former Soviet Union, and by the easy access to Eastern Europe.
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This last point is important. The results of a survey on the borders of Poland with
Belarus, Ukraine and Russia reveal that Poland was not perceived by respondents to
be the destination country, but rather as a good place to learn about migration,
before inltrating the grey economic zones of Western Europe. According to Iglicka
(2001a), migration from Russia stopped in Poland, because of the much more di¢ cult
access to Western European countries. Iglicka (2001b) argued that
Migration pressure from the East induced by the collapse of the system, combined
with the restrictive migration policy of Western Europe towards former USSR coun-
tries, were conducive to the formation of the Central European bu¤er zone. Poland
is probably the best example of a bu¤er zone country.5
The only exception to restricted migration between East and West concerns ethnic
Germans. Between 1989 and 1999 an estimated 678,000 ethnic Germans moved to
the homeland. Although there were non-ethnic German foreign nationals moving,
their net migration experienced a sharp decline around 1992, to the extent that net
migration in the mid nineties was close to zero.
Of course by the turn of the century this situation changed, and migratory ows
between East and West increased signicantly. However, our papers focus is limited
to the 1990s. For that particular decade, assuming labor mobility within the East,
but no labor mobility between East and West seems adequate.
2.2 Main stylized facts
We now give an overview of the main stylized facts we aim to account for in our
theoretical model.
U-shaped pattern of relative income per capita between East and West
5Poland, the Czech Republic or Hungary will be an example of a Border country in the model
we will present later.
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Figure 1: U-shaped pattern of East-West relative income per capita
Figure 1 shows income per capita of East relative to West.6 As can be seen divergence
in the rst half of the decade was followed by convergence in the second half of the
decade.
U-shaped pattern of relative income per capita within East
A similar U-shaped pattern shows up when analyzing the income per capita of Hin-
terland relative to Border. This can be seen in Figure 2, where we consider the Czech
Republic, Hungary and Poland as the Border, and the rest of Eastern countries in-
cluded in our previous footnote as the Hinterland.
6Data come from the Penn World Tables. West has been dened as EU-15, and East as Albania,
Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Russia,
Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Uzbekistan.
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Figure 2: U-shaped pattern of relative income per capita within East.
U-shaped pattern of industrialization between East and West
In Figure 3 we plot total East-West relative manufacturing production during the
period 1993-2000. Unfortunately, we do not have data for the rst three years of
the decade, which probably prevents us from observing the magnitude of the initial
slump. Data are expressed in values of the 1999 local currencies, i.e. they are not
expressed in a common currency, although we can probably capture the main trends.7
Continued deindustrialization of Hinterland
This stylized fact is sensitive to the inclusion / exclusion of Russia within the
Hinterland, since that country reindustrialized signicantly in the second half of the
7Data are collected from the wiiw Industrial Database for Eastern Europe (Wien) and the Gronin-
gen Growth and Development Center. We include the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland as the
Border, whereas we only have access to Romania and the Slovak Republic as the Hinterland.
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Figure 3: U-shaped pattern of industrialization between East and West.
decade, for reasons probably disconnected from our chain of causality.
3 The model
Consider a model with two countries (West and East) and three regions (one region
in West, and Border and Hinterland in East). The three regions are denoted by
W (West), B (Border) and H (Hinterland). There are two sectors, agriculture and
industry, and two factors of production, labor and land. Both countries have identical
technologies and endowments, though West is better integrated due to the absence
of internal trade costs. In practice, this turn West into a larger market. The regions
of East are equally large in terms of land. Whereas labor is immobile between East
and West, it may or may not be mobile within East. Part of our policy experiment
consists in understanding how the introduction of migratory ows between Border
and Hinterland a¤ects relative economic performance. Trade in industrial goods is
11
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Figure 4: Continuous deindustrialization of Hinterland, which consists here of Roma-
nia and Slovakia.
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subject to transport costs, which are higher between Hinterland and West, than
between Border and West. The agricultural sector is perfectly competitive, and uses
land and labor as its input. Since land is only used in agriculture, its supply is xed, so
that the agricultural sector faces decreasing returns to labor. This entails agriculture
endogenously takes place in all locations. The industrial sector is monopolistically
competitive. As in Krugman and Venables (1995), industrial rms use labor and
intermediate goods, which gives rise to forward and backward linkages. The detailed
description of the model in the following subsections is similar to Puga (1999).
3.1 Endowments
We have tried to avoid any interference of comparative-advantage forces to make
our point. That is, countries and regions do not di¤er in their access to technology
or relative endowments of labor and land, but just in their locational advantage.
That advantage is itself endogenous, and linked to the interplay of international and
interregional trade costs, as the former decrease over time.
In particular, let us denote by Ki and mi the stocks of labor and land in location
i, respectively. The former is an invariable parameter of the model, whereas the latter
will end up being endogenous, once we allow for labor mobility between Border and
Hinterland within the East. In particular, we will set KH = KB = 1=2; KW = mW =
1; mH +mB = 1:
3.2 Industry
Trade in manufactures is subject to iceberg transport costs. Between West and Bor-
der, for one unit to arrive, B units should be shipped, where B>1. The internal
trade cost between Border and Hinterland is T, where T>1. Between West and Hin-
terland, Border plays the role of a portthrough which all goods nees to be shipped.
This implies that trade cost between West and Hinterland, H , must be equal to BT .
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The industrial sector is monopolistically competitive. There is a continuum of
manufacturing varieties whose available mass in each location is an endogenous vari-
able. Following Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), production of a quantity x(k) of any variety
k requires the same xed () and variable (x(k)) quantities of the production input
in any location. This combined with symmetry and increasing returns ensures that in
equilibrium no variety is produced by more than one rm in more than one country.
The production input in manufacturing is a Cobb-Douglas composite of labor and
an aggregate of intermediates. Following Ethier (1982), all industrial goods enter
symmetrically into the intermediate aggregate, with a constant elasticity of substi-
tution across varieties (>1). The price index of the aggregate industrial composite
used by rms is region specic, and in the case of location B it is dened by
qB =
Z
hnB
p1 B (h)dh+
Z
h0nW
p1 w (h
0)  1 B dh
0 +
Z
h00nH
p1 H (h
0
) T 1 dh
0
 1
1 
(1)
where pi represents the price of a locally-produced manufacturing variety in region i.
We have also denoted by ni the available mass of manufacturing varieties produced
in region i. (The price indices of the other regions can be dened by analogy). Now
that we have determined the price of the intermediate composite, we can write down
the cost function of a manufacturing rm h located in region i that produces output
xi (h):
Cih = (+ xi(h))q

i w
1 
i (2)
where wi stands for the local wage in region i, and  (0    1) is the share of
intermediates in rmscosts (an indicator of the strength of vertical linkages).
3.3 Agriculture
Agriculture is perfectly competitive. It produces a homogeneous good - which plays
the role of numeraire (pAi = 18i) -, using labor and land with a constant returns
to scale technology described by the production function yi = g(LAi ; Ki). Ki is the
stock of arable land available in location i and LAi denotes agricultural employment.
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In our particular case - as in Puga (1999) - , function g will be a Cobb-Douglas
production function: g(LAi ; Ki) = L
A
i
 K1 i : Therefore, from the landownersprot
maximization we can obtain the following demand for agricultural labor:
LAi = Ki


wi
 1
1 
(3)
We incorporate a system of public landownership: once agricultural rents have been
collected - they are perfectly taxed away and rebated to the local workers in a lump
sum fashion.
Let us denote by mi the total population living in location i, and by Ri the per-
capita agricultural rents rebated to the local workers living in i. In particular, using
(3) and the agricultural production function, it is easy to show that
Ri =

(1  )Ki


wi
 
1 

mi
(4)
3.4 Preferences
Turning to the demand side, consumers have Cobb-Douglas preferences over the agri-
cultural good and a CES composite of industrial goods, with industrial expenditure
share  (0    1) : For simplicity, all industrial varieties produced are assumed to
enter consumers utility function with the same constant elasticity of substitution
with which they enter rmstechnology. This generates the following indirect utility
function for workers living in location i:
Vi = q
 
i Yi (5)
where Yi stands for the income of a representative worker in location i, which consists
of labor earnings and the rural and urban rents rebated proportionally to the local
population.
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3.5 Residential Sector
We follow Krugman and Livas Elizondo (1996) and introduce commuting costs in-
ternal to each region. This provides a source of congestion, which prevents the full
agglomeration of all Eastern manufactures in the Border region. In each of the three
locations, we assume the existence of a Central Business District (CBD) to which
the local population must commute in order to supply their amount of e¤ective la-
bor. That population is distributed along a segment centered at the CBD, and every
worker must allocate inelastically a unit of time between e¤ective labor and commut-
ing8. As can be expected, those commuting costs will be higher the further away
every commuter is from the CBD. In particular, a commuter living at a distance x
from the CBD will supply 1   2x units of time to the labor market, where  is the
parameter that measures the strength of commuting costs.
Consequently, the local stock of e¤ective labor in i will be
Li = 2
mi
2Z
0
(1  2x) dx = mi (1  (mi=2)) (6)
wheremi denotes the size of the population living in location i. Since the distribution
of population across CEE regions turns out to be endogenous, we will consider that
mB +mH = 1 in the case of perfect labor-mobility within the East. In the case of
perfect labor-mobility restrictions, we will exogenously set mB = mH = 1=2:
Moreover, the extra income that a worker can gain by living closer to the CBD
will be exactly compensated by higher rent costs paid to the landowners, in such a
way that all local workers enjoy the same utility level. This implies that the real
urban rent R(x) to be paid by a worker living in location i can be derived as follows:
RUi (x) = wi(1  2x)  wi(1  mi) = wi(mi   2x) (7)
8For simplicity, we assume that both farmers and manufacturing workers need to commute to
the CBD. That is believed to be innocuous for our main qualitative conclusions.
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Since all urban rents are collected and proportionally rebated to the local population,
we need to compute the magnitude of the urban rebate, which - from (7), will be
equal to
Urban Rebate =
2
mi
2Z
0
RUi (x) dx
mi
= wi
mi
2

Therefore, adding up labor income and rural and urban rebates, nominal income
Yi = wi(1  
mi
2

) +Ri (8)
3.6 Labor Mobility
There is no labor mobility between West and East, but there may be labor mobility
between Border and Hinterland. As is standard in the literature, migration is as-
sumed to be myopic, acting only in response to current real-wage di¤erentials. Labor
mobility has the e¤ect of eliminating real-income di¤erences, net of commuting costs,
between Border and Hinterland:
YBq
 
B = YH q
 
H (9)
3.7 General Equilibrium
Individual demands coming from workers, all of which share the same elasticity of
substitution , are calculated by using Roys identity on expression (5) and summed
in each region. Demands coming from individual rms, which also share the same
elasticity of substitution, are calculated by using Shephard´s lemma and summed in
each region. As a result, total demand for a rm in region i producing variety h,
xi(h);is
xi(h) =
X
jfB;H;Wg
(pj(h))
 ej q 1j T
1 
ij (10)
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where Tij is the indicator of transport costs from i to j, and ei is the total expenditure
on manufactures in region i:
ei = 

wimi(1  
mi
2

) +miRi

+ 
Z
h2ni
C(h) dh (11)
The rst term in expression (11) is the value of consumer expenditure, since con-
sumers spend a fraction  of their income on manufactures, where consumer income
is the sum of labor income and the rebate of urban and agricultural rents. The nal
term is intermediate demand, generated as rms spend fraction  of their costs on
manufactures.
Di¤erentiating demand with respect to a rms own price - after substituting
expressions (1), (2) and (11) into (10) - shows that every rm faces a constant price
elasticity  in every region. All rms producing in any particular region then have
the same prot - maximizing producer price, which is a constant relative mark-up
over marginal cost:
pi =

   1q

i w
1 
i = q

i w
1 
i (12)
where we have applied the normalization 
 1 = 1.
Even though rms set a unique price for their output regardless of whether it is
sold domestically or exported, the consumer price paid per unit received is either T ,
B or TB times higher in the region where the good has to be imported. The prots
of each manufacturing rm in region B are, from expressions (2) and (12),
B =
1

h
q
(1 )
B w
(1 )(1 )
B
 
q 1B eB + q
 1
H eH + q
 1
W eWI
  qBw1 B i
or, equivalently,
i =
pi

(xi   1) (13)
where  = T 1 ;I =  1 B and we have applied the normalization  =
1

:This means
that
xi = 1 (14)
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is the unique level of output giving rms zero prots.
On the other hand, given (1) and (12), the price-index equation for region B can
be written implicitly as follows:
q1 B =
 
qBw
1 
B
1 
nB +
 
qHw
1 
H
1 
nH +
 
qWw
1 
W
1 
nwI (15)
and the same can be done with qH and qW .
Turning to the labor market, from (2) and (3), the labor-market clearing condition
can be written as
(1  )C(h)i
wi
ni +Ki


wi
 1
1 
= Li = mi (1  (mi=2)) (16)
The rst term in the left-hand side of (16) is labor demand in manufacturing, ob-
tained by application of Shephard´s lemma to (2). The second term stands for the
agricultural demand for labor, which is given by expression (3). If we add up both
terms, the sum must be equal to the available supply of e¤ective labor, given by (6).
Now we are ready to give a formal denition of a Steady State associated with a
given level of B:
Denition 1 A Steady State associated with a given B is a vector of prices and
allocations fpi;; wi; qi; xi; Ri; Yi; Ci;mB; ei; ni; i 2 fB;H;Wgg that satises
1. Equation (1): qB =
hR
hnB
p1 B (h)dh+
R
h0nW
p1 w (h
0)  1 B dh
0 +
R
h
00nH
p1 H (h
0
) T 1 dh
0
i 1
1 
(Denition of price-index of local intermediate composite)
2. Equation (12): pi = q

i w
1 
i (Prot Maximization by manufacturing rms)
3. Equation (10): xi(h) =
P
jfB;H;Wg(pj(h))
 ej q 1j T
1 
ij (Utility maximization
by consumers and cost minimization by rms; the market of every manufacturing
variety clears).
4. Equation (11): ei = 
 
wimi(1  
 
mi
2

) +miRi

+ 
R
h2ni C(h) dh (Aggrega-
tion of consumer and rm expenditure on manufactures).
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5. Equation (4): Ri =
 
(1 )Ki


wi
 
1 
!
mi
(Prot maximization in agriculture).
6. Equation (2): Cih = ( + xi(h))q

i w
1 
i (Denition of the cost function for
every variety).
7. Equation (16): (1   )C(h)i
wi
ni + Ki


wi
 1
1 
= mi (1   (mi=2)) (Local labor
market clearing).
8. (xi   1)ni = 0, xi  1; ni  0:(Free entry / zero-prot condition for local
manufacturing rms).
9. Equation (8): Yi = wi(1  
 
mi
2

) +Ri (Denition of nominal income).
10. Equation (9): YBq
 
B = YH q
 
H (Determination of relative labor supply in
Border and Hinterland when labor mobility is allowed; otherwise, the relevant equation
is mB = 1=2).
The rst nine conditions above are linked to three equations, one for each location;
whereas condition 10 is only expressed by equation (9). Therefore, computing a steady
state for every value of B is a static problem with 28 equations and 28 unknowns.
It is useful to think of short-run prots as being related to the number of rms
in each region by four forces: product and labor-market competition, and cost and
demand linkages. A larger number of rms producing in the same region increases
demand for labor, leading to higher wage costs - expression (16). Product market
competition is also tougher in regions where more varieties are produced locally; if
more varieties are available locally instead of being imported subject to trade costs
then the price index of industrial goods is lower - expression (1) -so, for a given
price and level of expenditure, local demand for each industrial good is smaller -
expression (10). Product and labor market competition tend to make rms located
in markets with relatively many rms less protable, encouraging exit and leading
to the geographical dispersion of industry. Therefore, these two forces are sometimes
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called "neoclassical".
Pulling in the opposite direction there are cost and demand linkages. Cost linkages
come from the lower prices that rms and consumers have to pay for manufactures
in regions where there are relatively many rms - expressions (1), (2) and (5). De-
mand linkages arise as an increase in the number of demand rms and / or workers
raises local expenditure on manufactures - expression (11). Cost and demand linkages
tend to increase the short-run protability of rms in regions with a large number
of rms, and they lead to entry. When they are strong enough they can overturn
product and labor-market competition, thereby making dispersed outcomes unstable
and triggering industrial agglomeration.
In the long run, prots must be zero wherever there is a positive measure of rms,
and there must be no rms wherever prots are negative. That adjustment takes place
increasing the number of rms if prots are positive and decreasing it (for potential,
if not for actual, rms) whenever they are negative.
4 Numerical Simulations
The goal of this section is to analyze the e¤ect of trade liberalization and labor
mobility on development, industrialization and population density. We conduct two
di¤erent experiments. In both of them we look at the e¤ects of a gradual decrease in
international trade costs (B), while keeping a xed value of internal trade costs (T )
between Border and Hinterland. In the rst experiment there is no labor mobility
of any kind, neither between East and West nor between Border and Hinterland. In
the second experiment, trade liberalization is followed by the introduction of labor
mobility within the East, between Border and Hinterland.
Our choice of parameter values will be identical to Puga and Venables (1997)s
with respect to  = 0; 55;  = 0:5; and  = 0:8. However, we selected  = 3 instead
of  = 4 in order to t better with the observables. On the other hand, we had
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to assign some values to the new parameters in our model:  = 0:85;  = 0:05;
KH = KB = 1=2; KW = mW = 1; mH + mB = 1: The degree of internal trade
openness between Border and Hinterland () is, by assumption, always bigger or
equal than the degree of international trade freeness (I).
4.1 Trade Liberalization without Labor Mobility
We can observe our results for the fully-restricted-labor-mobility case in gures 5
and 6, where the horizontal axis in each panel shows the level of international trade
openness (B), assumed to be bigger or equal to T = 1; 08. Our simulations do not
intend to capture the whole set of stable steady-states at any level of international
trade costs: we just obtain a stable steady-state for the initial value of trade openness,
and make the economy follow a sequence of subsequent steady states as those costs
decrease.
In a separate experiment, we have also tried to introduce the whole trade reform
all at once, followed by a transition. Finally, once the steady state was reached, we
incorporated the migratory reform. The results were not qualitatively di¤erent from
those we will present next.
Moreover, another comment is due about our chances to capture multiple steady
states. For a given B, we tried to study systematically the number of steady states
and their evolution as trade costs decreased, by means of the unit simplex developed
in Puga and Venables (1997). The main technical di¤erence between our framework
and theirs is the existence of asymmetric locations in our model. Under symmetric
locations - as in Puga and Venables (1997) - the number of steady states can be safely
studied in the unit simplex.
However, in our model, we rst found - in the unit simplex - a number of steady
states where prots were equalized across locations. Later we varied the global mass
of varieties to make prots equal to zero everywhere, and found that the number
of steady states was di¤erent: some of the previously obtained in the unit-simplex
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Figure 5: East-West real wage ratio without labor mobility.
had simply disappeared. It was always possible to vary the global mass of varieties
and obtain di¤erent zero-prot steady states, in such a way that all possibilities were
never exhausted.
In order to limit such a complexity, we focused on a given sequence of steady states
as trade openness increased, without exploring the whole space of manufacturing
shares. During the transition between steady states - each one characterized by a
di¤erent value of B - we followed a simple law of motion, increasing (decreasing)
the local mass of varieties where prots were positive (negative), until the free-entry
condition was satised.
We must emphasize that - at least under our parameterization - the revival of
East relative to West, and of Hinterland relative to Border, would not take place in
the absence of internal labor mobility. Initially, trade liberalization involves tougher
competition for both Eastern locations, whereas the larger Western market is hardly
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Figure 6: Hinterland-Border real wage ratio without labor mobility.
a¤ected by the scant Eastern competitors. This leads to a process of international
(East-West) divergence (see gure 5).
Nevertheless, openness to the large market not only implies tougher competition,
but also higher exports and cheaper imports of intermediates for the East, specially for
the Border. That proximity to the largest market is crucial for the Border to absorb
most of the manufacturing share of the Hinterland, which reduces the standards of
living in the latter location and leads to a process of interregional divergence (see
gure 6). Both characteristics seem to correspond roughly to the initial years of the
transition period, when we know that migrations within East were still subject to
signicant restrictions.
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Figure 7: Percentage of Eastern Population in Border.
4.2 Trade Liberalization and Labor Mobility within East
We have checked that, by introducing the migratory liberalization in the midst of the
trade liberalization process - as we think it took place in the real world- we are able to
replicate more closely our stylized facts, reected on gures 1-4. To that purpose, we
have tentatively chosen a level of  = 0:45 as the particular point where migrations
within the East are fully allowed. We can observe in gure 7 that, immediately after
the migratory liberalization is enacted, an important contingent of population ows
from Hinterland to Border in response to higher real wages (net of congestion costs).
This higher degree of population concentration within the East enlarges the home-
market of this country and attracts a higher world share of manufacturing varieties,
in such a way that international real-wage levels start to converge.
If we plot the average real wages of East andWest (and Border& Hinterland within
the East), we obtain two U-shaped curves very similar to Figure 2. It is noticeable
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Figure 8: East-West and Border-Hinterland convergence after divergence
that the policy shock triggers an international convergence trend that is reinforced
by the last stages of trade openness, once lower labor costs nally induce rms to
relocate towards the East. The same policy reform is responsible for the relative
improvement of the living standards in the Hinterland relative to the Border, given
that the labor-supply e¤ect outweighs the home-market gain in the Border and the
deterioration in the Hinterland.
4.3 Some Normative Implications
Nevertheless, the migratory liberalization has also a di¤erent, unexpected e¤ect on
real wages. Since almost the whole manufacturing sector gets concentrated in West
and Border, there is no longer need to trade in intermediates with Hinterland. There-
fore, internal transport costs within the East are mostly skipped, which allows rms
to quote lower prices and provide higher real wages everywhere. That is the sense
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in which internal labor mobility turns out to be Pareto-improving for an appropriate
parameterization.
However, it can be shown that any normative implication of the migratory reform
lacks generality and robustness in the context of this model. For instance, under an
absentee-landownership system (instead of a public one) the migratory balance would
have been smaller and the Hinterland would have retained a signicant amount of
manufactures. The subsequent split of Western vertical linkages would have generated
a welfare loss for the West and the Border, together with a gain for the Hinterland.
This happens because, in essence, the migration has a double e¤ect on Western
indirect utility: on the one hand, the West loses part of its manufacturing share in
favor of the Border, which reduces the e¤ectiveness of vertical linkages; on the other
hand, the Hinterland is left out of the game, which reduces trade costs and increases
that e¤ectiveness. Therefore, the model can help us understand the forces at stake,
though we can not make denite predictions about local welfare9.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have examined some mechanisms - exclusively related to economic
geography, trade openness and freedom to migrate - as possible factors to account
for the recent real-income prole of CEE countries. We have deliberately disregarded
any interference of technological di¤erences across regions or unrelated public-policy
factors. As a result, the belated incorporation of freer international trade and new
labor mobility emerge as candidates to explain the evolution of both external and
internal disparities.
A di¤erent normative implication points at internal labor mobility as a potentially
Pareto-improving measure, at least in a context where labor-force heterogeneity, as-
9Those predictions would always depend on our particular choice of parameter values. For in-
stance, our choice of  looks specially relevant for the convenience of agglomeration in a single
location.
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Figure 9: Local real-wage levels with labor mobility.
similation costs, etc. do not play a major role.
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